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Abstract:  
Accountability is a concept that has been frequently referred to in Anglo-American 
systems and in the OECD’s corporate governance documents, as well as in the English 
translations of corporate governance documents from non-English speaking 
jurisdictions. It is in the Anglo-American literature, in particular, where the word finds 
prominence. It has been suggested in China that accountability is one of the basic 
principles of corporate governance that needs to be consistently enforced.   But does 
this mean that board accountability, as it has been provided for in the Anglo-American 
system, is actually an element of Chinese corporate governance? If not, should it be 
adopted? Or should China develop a concept that is more appropriately included as a 
critical part of its own particular corporate governance needs? The paper aims to 
address these matters in order to ascertain where Chinese corporate governance stands 
on accountability as far as the boards of large listed companies are concerned, and what 
it should do. We opine that while there are elements of accountability in Chinese 
corporate governance, it does not have the form of accountability embraced in Anglo-
American systems. But, it is argued, as China moves from having a system totally based 
on administrative governance to one that is based more on economic governance the 
kind of approach that applies in Anglo-American jurisdictions is likely to become more 
relevant. Within a hybrid corporate governance system combining elements of both 
administrative and economic governance, we develop a unique “wenze system” with 
forms and characters of accountability that is likely to develop to address the needs of 
corporate governance in China and the fostering of its listed companies. 
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Undoubtedly China has become an economic powerhouse over the past twenty years; 
it is now the second largest economy in the world in nominal US dollar terms.3 As part 
of this economic development China has been seeking to develop its commercial 
systems, to encourage the incorporation and expansion of large corporate entities and 
to make sure that these companies are competitive, efficient and attractive for 
investment. Over the last decade company law and corporate governance issues in 
China have received much attention, both in theory and in practice, with the Chinese 
Government making this area a top priority. This is manifested by the establishment of 
many government-funded corporate governance research centres, such as the Chinese 
Centre for Corporate Governance at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.4 The 
focus has been primarily on how to develop an effective corporate governance system 
in order to improve the performance of listed companies and protect their shareholders 
and stakeholders, and with the additional objective of establishing an international 
corporate governance standard. 5  The improvement of corporate governance is an 
ongoing battle that calls for the participation of many people and entities, such as 
regulators, market participants and academics. In order to have standards that are 
congruent with those applied internationally, successive Chinese governments have 
been developing policies to create internationally recognised oversight mechanisms and 
corporate governance models in order to improve public confidence, both domestically 
and internationally. The development of Chinese company law and other related 
legislation and codes of practice has allowed listed companies in China to shape their 
structure in a more modern manner and to imitate their counterparts in developed 
markets, giving Chinese listed companies a “Western appearance.” 
 
An important aspect of Chinese economic development is ensuring that the corporate 
governance environment in which companies are to operate is rigorous and respected. 
For some years China has been concerned that its corporate governance framework 
should accord with OECD recommendations, and that it should meet international 
standards.  
                                                 
3  China-Britain Business Council: 
http://www.cbbc.org/who_we_are/china_context/uk_china_factfile (accessed on 4th November 2015). 
4  See C. Hawes and T. Chiu, “Flogging a dead horse? Why Western-style corporate governance 
reform will fail in China and what should be done instead?” (2006) 20 Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law 25. 
5  Y. Cheung, P. Jiang, P. Limpaphayom and T. Lu, “Does corporate governance matter in China?” 
(2008) 19 China Economic Review 460 at 460. 
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The board of directors, which is granted broad powers in order to manage a company, 
plays a major role in corporate life in any jurisdiction. Various sources have identified 
the accountability of boards as a critical issue in the governance of companies. The 
UK’s Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(commonly known as the “Cadbury Report”) said in 1992 that: “The issue for corporate 
governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of directors to 
shareholders.”6 According to the G20/OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
the corporate governance framework should ensure the accountability of boards to the 
company and the shareholders. 7  It has been stated on many occasions that good 
corporate governance is best achieved by focusing on the accountability of directors. It 
has been argued that accountability of directors is the basis for the success of all other 
principles of corporate governance.8 Holding directors accountable for their behaviour 
and decisions is fundamental to good corporate governance.9 Clearly, in the main, 
accountability is seen as something that is good and commendable. In fact, it has been 
said that “accountability” has become an icon of good governance, 10  and board 
accountability has been held up as a cornerstone of effective corporate governance.11 
Boards in Anglo-American jurisdictions12 enjoy very wide powers and discharge a 
whole range of functions, making them the very centre of companies.13 The board of 
                                                 
6  1 December 1992, Gee, under the chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury, at para 6.1 and 
accessible at : http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
7  G20/OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, at 51 and accessible at:  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed on 15th September 
2015). 
8  E. Makuta, “Towards Good Corporate Governance in State-Owned Industries: The 
Accountability of Directors” (2009) 3 Malawi Law Journal 55 at 56. While the author was writing about 
the corporate governance of State Owned Enterprises, it is argued that the comment is just as applicable 
to the normal commercial public company. 
9  J. Solomon and A. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (John Wiley & Sons, 
2004), at 14. 
10  M. Dubnick & K. Yang, ‘The Pursuit of Accountability: Promise, Problems, and Prospects’ in 
D.C. Menzel & H.L. White (edns), The State of Public Administration: Issues, Challenges and 
Opportunities (Routledge  2011), 171. 
11  A. Young, “Corporate Governance in China and Hong Kong: Reconciling Traditional Chinese 
Values, Regulatory Innovation and Accountability” 2011 at 3 and accessible at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533904 (accessed on 8 July 2015). 
12  This includes many countries, such as the UK, the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
13  For example, in relation to the UK see the Companies Act 2006, s.172(1). In relation to the US 
see H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439; G. Hayden and M. Bodie, “Shareholder Primacy and the Curious Turn Toward Board 
Primacy” (2010) 51 William and Mary Law Review 2071 at 2081; Dodge v Ford (1919) 170 NW 668 at 
684 (Mich). In relation to Australia, see the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, Commonwealth of Australia, Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating 
Value (2006) Chapter 4 and accessible at: 
4 
 
directors in China also has broad powers and functions. It is the de facto decision-
making body of the company, 14  and it is regarded as an important mechanism in 
providing for sound corporate governance.15 Article 46 of China’s Company Law 2005 
provides that the board of directors has, inter alia, the following functions and powers: 
deciding on the operational plans of the company; formulating the financial budget plan 
and final accounts for the year; formulating plans for profit distribution and for making 
up the losses of the company; preparing plans for the increase or reduction of capital 
and the issue of corporate bonds; determining what administrative bodies need to be 
established; appointing or dismissing the manager of the company; and deciding on the 
management system of the company. In China, as in many other countries around the 
world such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands,16 companies have two boards, 
namely a board of management and a board of supervision. 17  However, unlike 
supervisory boards in other nations, and particularly Germany, this type of board in 
China has limited powers. For instance, it does not appoint the members of the board 
of directors; they are appointed by the shareholders’ meeting.18 
 
Accountability is a concept that is frequently referred to in Anglo-American systems 
and in the OECD’s documents, as well as in the English translations of corporate 
governance documents from non-English-speaking jurisdictions. It is in the Anglo-
American literature in particular where the word finds prominence. The word is peculiar 
to the English language, but nevertheless it has been considered to be an important 
element in other systems. For example, the Brazilians became so frustrated with the fact 
that Portuguese does not have an equivalent word for accountability that the English 
word has been officially accepted as part of its formal lexicon.19 The Japanese have 
                                                 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Servic
es/Completed_inquiries/2004-07/corporate_responsibility/report/index (accessed on 8th July 2015); 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, ‘The Social Responsibility of Corporations’ December 
2006 at pp.102–113 and accessible at 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2006/$file/CSR_Report.pd
f (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
14  Y. Kang, L. Shi and E. Brown, Chinese Corporate Governance (Santa Monica, Rand 
Corporation, 2008) at 14. 
15  H. Liu and M. Fong, “Board characteristics of medium to large Chinese companies” (2010) 10 
Corporate Governance 163 at 163. 
16  Companies in the Netherlands can now choose to have a single board, but two tier boards still 
predominate. 
17  See article 118 of the Company Law 2005. 
18  See article 38(2) of the Company Law 2005. 
19  M. J. Dubnick, ‘Accountability as Cultural Keyword’  in M. Bovens, R.E. Goodin, T. 
Schillenmans (edns) The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press) at 23. 
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many words for responsibility but only one term that equates to accountability, and that 
is a transliteration of the English word.20 This manifests the fact that the meaning of 
words and concepts can be lost in translation. 
 
It has been suggested in China that accountability is one of the basic principles of 
corporate governance that needs to be consistently enforced. 21  So, some form of 
accountability as far as boards are concerned is a critical element of a well-functioning 
corporate governance system, but what sort of concept of accountability is provided for 
in China? Is it the same or similar to that provided for in the Anglo-American system? 
If not, should that applying in the latter be adopted? Or should China develop a concept 
that is more appropriate for its own particular corporate governance needs? The paper 
aims to address these matters in order to ascertain where Chinese corporate governance 
stands on accountability as far as the boards of large listed companies are concerned, 
and what it should do.  
 
Tackling these issues is important given the fact that many Chinese government and 
non-government bodies have made it clear that accountability of boards is an integral 
aspect of Chinese corporate governance. Understanding and developing accountability 
in China in a way that is appropriate for China’s current needs and aspirations is 
particularly important so as to provide guidance, especially for legislators, boards of 
directors, those drafting corporate reports, codes and legislation, shareholders and 
stakeholders. An appreciation of what accountability involves as a concept is necessary 
in constructing appropriate mechanisms that will ensure that accountability occurs. The 
paper argues that there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of accountability in 
Chinese corporate governance, and it certainly is not equivalent to the approach adopted 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. It is argued that Chinese corporate governance should 
not borrow the Anglo-American concept of accountability in corporate governance, 
although it can learn from it, but rather it should embrace what we term as a “wenze 
                                                 
20  Ibid at 23.  
21  Protiviti/China and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Corporate Governance Assessment 
Summary Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012 at 1: 
http://www.protiviti.co.uk/China-en/Documents/CN-en-2012-Corporate-Governance-Survey-
Report.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015) 
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system” of accountability that will enhance corporate governance and be able to develop 
a unique Chinese approach to fit into its unique corporate governance.22 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, there is a consideration of the meaning of 
accountability in corporate governance with an emphasis on board accountability. 
Second, the paper introduces the concept of hybrid corporate governance that operates 
in China and identifies the nature of listed companies in China with a focus on the 
power behind these companies. This is followed by an examination of whether the 
concept of accountability, as envisaged in Anglo-American systems, has been 
understood in China and is operating in Chinese companies and a proposal for an 
accountability system that is unique, dynamic and workable in Chinese corporate 
governance. The discussion includes a linguistic analysis of legal documentation and 
some empirical research undertaken in relation to corporate reports in various industrial 
sectors and academic arguments relating to developing the accountability of boards in 
China through the employment of what is called a “wenze system” of accountability. 
Fourthly, consideration is given to the way that accountability has been used in the 
context of administrative law in China in order to determine whether that could 
contribute to developing a Chinese approach to accountability. Finally, there are some 
concluding remarks. 
 
II The Notion of Accountability  
 
So, as mentioned earlier, board accountability is important, with the UK’s Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills finding that along with transparency it is the most 
important element of good corporate governance.23 Other commentators have said that 
to improve corporate governance practices it is necessary to foster the effectiveness and 
                                                 
22  This is in accord with the recommendations of the Asian Development Bank : Governance : 
Sound Development Management, 1995 and referred to in J. Iu and J. Batten, “The Implementation of 
OECD Corporate Governance Principles in Post-Crisis Asia” (2000) 4 Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship 47 at 51. 
23  The definition originally appeared at : http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/corp-
governance/page15267.html, but now this has been superseded by the following link: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090902193559/berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/corp-
governance/page15267.html (accessed  on 8th July 2015). 
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accountability of boardrooms.24The G20/OECD stated that: “The corporate governance 
framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company 
and the shareholders.”25 But what does accountability in this context actually entail? 
We consider this from an Anglo-American perspective given that ‘accountability’ is an 
English word and the concept of accountability has been emphasised repeatedly in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, and transnational codes such as the OECD’s Principles 
of Corporate Governance have obviously based their reference to accountability on the 
Anglo-American approach. 
 
Although accountability has been mentioned frequently in the corporate governance 
literature, has been used often in definitions of corporate governance, and has been 
relied on as a critical factor in corporate governance by a variety of sources,26 there 
have been few attempts to explain what it actually means, certainly in the context of 
corporate governance. This is to be contrasted with other areas of law and society, such 
as public administration, politics and even administrative law, where there have been 
several attempts to articulate and develop the notion of accountability.27 The reason 
                                                 
24  I. Filatotchev et al., ‘Key Drivers of “Good” Corporate Governance and the Appropriateness of 
UK Policy Responses,’ Final Report, January 2007, DTI, at p.7 and accessible at: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file36671.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
25  G20/OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, at 51 and accessible at:  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed on 15th September 
2015). 
26  For example, see, S. Demirag, Corporate governance, accountability and pressure to perform: 
An international study (Stamford, Conn, JAI Press, 1998); D. Bavly, Corporate Governance and 
Accountability: What Role for the Regulator, Director and Auditor? (Westport, Quorum Books, 1999); 
R. Warren, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Liverpool, Liverpool Academic Press, 2000); R. 
Aguilera, “Corporate governance and Director Accountability : an Institutional Comparative 
Perspective” (2005) 16 British Journal of Management S39; R. Jones, “Law, Norms and the Breakdown 
of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance” (2006) 92 Iowa Law Review 105; H. 
Hutchison, “Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the 
Accountability/Authority Paradigm” (2005) 36 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 1111; P. Koh et 
al., “Accountability and Value Enhancement Roles of Corporate Governance” (2007) 47 Accounting and 
Finance. 305; N. Brennan and J. Solomon, “Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of 
accountability: an overview” (2008) 21 Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal 885; 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Guidance for Directors (Canberra, Australian 
Government, April 2010) at pp.13–15 and accessible at: 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2010/$file/Guidance_for_
directors_Report_April2010.pdf (accessed  on 8th July 2015). 
27  For instance, see B. Romzek and M. Dubnick, ‘Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons 
from the Challenger Tragedy’ (1987) 47 Public Administration Review 223; R Mulgan, 
‘“Accountability”: An Ever Expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public Administration 555; R Mulgan, 
Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 
2003); P Jos and M Tompkins, ‘The Accountability Paradox in an Age of Reinvention: The Perennial 
Problem of Preserving Character and Judgment’ (2004) 36 Administration and Society 255; L. 
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might be that accountability is notoriously difficult to articulate; it is certainly a 
complicated and elusive concept.28 Therefore, a sense of what accountability actually 
involves in a precise way has been lacking.29   
 
It has been argued, and we accept it here for the purposes of discussion and analysis, 
that accountability in relation to corporate governance, certainly as far as Anglo-
American corporate governance is concerned, entails a process involving several 
stages.30 Before considering these stages it must be recognised that for accountability 
to occur, boards (the accountor) need to accept responsibility for their actions or 
inactions.31  If boards fail to acknowledge the fact that accountability constitutes a 
critical aspect of corporate governance, there cannot be worthwhile and effective 
accountability to the accountee (the shareholders). Unless boards take responsibility, 
they are likely to engage in thwarting the effectiveness of many of the accountability 
mechanisms that have been established. If a person is not responsible for something, in 
the sense either of being assigned particular duties in respect of it or of having caused 
the end result, he or she would not usually be held to account for it.32 Acceptance of the 
need for board members to be accountable does not, of itself, necessarily demand any 
action, but it is an attitude that should exist within boards. 
 
                                                 
O’Connell, ‘Program Accountability as an Emergent Property: The Role of Stakeholders in a Program’s 
Field’ (2005) 65 Public Administration Review 85; C Harlow and R Rawlings, ‘Promoting 
Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 542; 
M. Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism’ (2010) 
33 West European Politics 946. 
28  R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 
2001) at 221; A. Sinclair, “The Chameleon of Accountability : Forms and Discourses” (1995) 20 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 219 at 221; I. Demirag, M. Dubnick and M. Khadaroo, 
“Exploring the Relationship Between Accountability and Performance in the UK’s Private Initiative 
(PFI)” at p7 – paper presented at the “Conference on Governing the Corporation: Mapping the Loci of 
Power in Corporate Governance Design,” at Queen’s University, Belfast, 20–21 September 2004; A. 
Sinclair, “The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses” (1995) 20 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 219 at 221; M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability : A 
Conceptual Framework” (2007) 13 European Law Journal 447 at 448, 449. 
29  M. Dubnick, “The Pursuit of Accountability: Promise, Problems, and Prospects” 2009, at 14 
and accessible at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548922 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
30  See A. Keay and J. Loughrey, “The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate 
Governance” (2015) 35 Legal Studies 252. 
31  Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission, Canadian Democracy and 
Corporate Accountability: An Overview of Issues, Toronto, 2001 at iii. 
32  R. Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”: An Ever Expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public Administration 
555 at 561. 
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Accountability generally, and certainly in the context of corporate governance, is not 
about a simple single meaning. It is a highly nuanced word. It is argued that there are 
in fact four stages involved in the accountability of boards,33 all of which contribute to 
the meaning of the word. The first stage is the board providing accurate information 
concerning its decisions and actions, so that shareholders are informed as to what has 
been done by it on behalf of the company. A part of this is transparency, which involves 
making disclosure and providing reports concerning the work of the board.34  The 
second stage involves a board explaining and justifying the things for which it is 
responsible, including what it has done and what it has failed to do.35 Often this is seen 
as the predominant aspect of accountability, involving the board being answerable for 
what it has done, and it is the stage that is often focused on by elements of the 
accountability literature dealing with other areas of society and law. This stage requires 
the board to justify and explain what it has done (or not done), and why. The third stage 
is constituted by the questioning and evaluating of the board’s reasons given for what 
has been done. Fourth, the final stage is that there is the possibility, but not the 
requirement, of the imposition of consequences. This might simply entail the provision 
of feedback to the board. It might, but it need not, constitute negative consequences 
which could involve some sort of sanction, perhaps involving the removal of one or 
more directors or the decision not to re-elect a director when his or her term comes to 
an end. 
 
III A Hybrid Corporate Governance Model and the Controlling Power of Chinese 
Listed Companies 
Before addressing the issue of accountability in the boards of Chinese companies, it is 
necessary to establish, albeit briefly, the framework of corporate governance in which 
any form of accountability will operate in China and to introduce the nature of power 
in Chinese companies. 
 
                                                 
33  A. Keay and J. Loughrey, “The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance” 
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 252. 
34  A. Licht, “Accountability and Corporate Governance,” 2002 at 24, 32 and accessible at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
35  AccountAbility, ‘AA1000 Framework Standards for Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing 
and Reporting’ (November 1999) 8, accessible at 
http://www.accountability.org/images/content/0/7/076/AA1000%20Overview.pdf (accessed on 8th July 
2015). 
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Corporate governance in China has emerged and developed in line with the shift of the 
Chinese economy from a planned to a market model. Unlike classic corporate 
governance models, the governance model adopted by Chinese listed firms can best be 
described as a control-based system, in which the controlling shareholders, and this is 
predominantly the State or State officials, “tightly control listed companies through 
concentrated ownership and management friendly boards”.36 This control-based model 
is a hybrid due to the gradual transition that is taking place in China, namely from 
administrative governance to economic governance, something that has been occurring 
over the past three decades during the transformation of the Chinese economy from a 
planned to a market model.37 It has meant that now China has a hybrid model with both 
administrative and economic dimensions. These two elements of governance are 
expected to co-exist and develop an equilibrium in China over a long period, during 
which there will inevitably be various institutional and ideological obstacles to be 
overcome. 38  The transition that has taken place thus far has led to a corporate 
governance model that is now characterised by gradualism, dualism, systematisation 
and path dependency.39 Any transition in the style of corporate governance can only be 
achieved through a long process and during this time both administrative and economic 
corporate governance models will co-exist. This transformation is a systematic one due 
to developments in legislation and legal enforcement, as well as changes in the nature 
of the shareholding ownership structure, all of which follows from the influence of 
Chinese traditions, history, values and culture.  
 
Within the administrative corporate governance mode directors of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) are appointed directly by the Chinese government, and directors 
always retain certain administrative roles within the government while also acting as 
                                                 
36  Q. Liu, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional 
Determinants’ (2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 415 at 429; see also N.W. Leung and M. Cheng, 
‘Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese State-Controlled Listed Firms’ (2013) 
6 China Journal of Accounting Research 89.  
37  W. Li, Y. Xu, J. Niu and A. Qiu, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance: International Trends and 
China’s Mode’ (2010) 3 Nankai Business Review International 4 at 5–7; see also W. Li, X. Chen and Q. 
Yuan, Chinese Corporate Governance: Road to Transition and Perfection (中国公司治理： 转型 与完
善之路) (Beijing: China Machine Press 2012) 139–141. 
38  See W. Li, X. Chen and Q. Yuan, Chinese Corporate Governance: Road to Transition and 
Perfection (中国公司治理： 转型 与完善之路) (Beijing: China Machine Press 2012) 140. 
39  W. Li and D. Yan, ‘Transition from Administrative to Economic Model of Corporate 
Governance: A New Analytical Framework for Research on China’s Corporate Governance’ (2013) 4 
Nankai Business Review International 4. 
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directors. Under this administrative corporate governance system the government 
always intervenes in the business decision-making process by the employment of 
administrative actions. This approach has been subject to criticism based on the fact 
that it produces an inefficient system of operation.  
 
The first and second rounds of privatisation of SOEs started in 1979 and 2014 
respectively, when thousands of poorly performing national and regional SOEs were 
privatised or liquidated.40 This manifests the transformation that is occurring, from a 
purely administrative model to a hybrid one.   
 
While, administrative corporate governance involves significant political involvement 
in the governance process, elsewhere in the world economic corporate governance is 
dominant. For instance, in Anglo-American systems there tends to be a focus on the 
economic power of companies, and as far as many companies are concerned this 
involves the directors running the company so that it makes as much profit as possible 
and in such a way as to lead to the maximisation of the wealth of shareholders. The 
model prevails in common law countries with an effective legal enforcement of 
shareholder rights. Corporate law provides relatively extensive protections for 
shareholders, and also courts are relatively active in enforcing those protections.    
 
The long-term coexistence of administrative and economic corporate governance is a 
unique element in China. The main characteristic of administrative corporate 
governance in China lies in the “administrativisation” of resource allocation, corporate 
objectives, and the appointment and removal of senior executives. The political 
involvement in, and impact on, corporate governance is seen as one of the 
manifestations of administrative corporate governance.41 The goal of reform in China, 
consistent with the reform of the modern enterprise system, is to change this dual character of 
corporate governance in the direction of pure economic governance, the latter being regarded, 
comparatively speaking, as a more mature and efficient approach to promoting company 
                                                 
40  See G. Wildau, ‘China Kicks off Second Round of Privatisation’ 10 August 2014; available via 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec28674c-13ac-11e4-84b7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DOzmmx3b (accessed 
on 15th September 2014). 
41  W. Li, A. Qiu and Z. Gu, ‘Dual Corporate Governance Environment, Political Connections 
Preference and Firm Performance – Study on Governance Transition of China’s Private Listed Firms (
双重公司治理环境_政治联系偏好与公司绩效_基于中国民营上市公司治理转型的研究) (2010) 6 
China Industrial Economics 85 at 94. 
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success.42 This transformation is characterised by the weakening of administrative governance 
and the strengthening of economic governance. However, the existing hybrid corporate 
governance model does retain many administrative characteristics and it continues to be subject 
to strong government interference and reliance on government support and direction. It is also 
shaped by top-down bureaucratic intervention and government control through the 
government’s controlling power over corporate management, via agents appointed by the State 
who were previously government officials.43 Therefore, an understanding and interpretation of 
how “accountability” works in administrative law will be helpful and appropriate to inform 
corporate governance research in China at the present time, and, perhaps, for some time in the 
future.  
Under this unique hybrid corporate governance model, listed companies in China can 
be divided into two broad groups: SOEs, and listed companies that are not controlled 
by the State (referred to here as “private companies” even though they are public 
companies as their shares are available to the public in general). Until early 2000 a 
reference to a listed company normally referred to listed SOEs, since before that date 
the overwhelming majority of listed companies were SOEs, whose largest shareholder 
normally is the State. Since then efforts have been made by the Chinese government to 
reduce the concentration of state shareholding, and it has a general objective to create 
a more dispersed and competitive shareholding structure, corporatisation and 
ownership diversification. This has led to the emergence of new owners such as 
individual minority shareholders, institutional investors, and employee shareholders.44 
But by September 2014, listed private companies outnumbered SOEs. While there are 
1007 SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, there are 1562 
private companies.45 As for the SOEs, the very high concentration of ownership is 
directly linked to control of the board of directors, which is regarded as a critical link 
                                                 
42  As indicated earlier, the pursuit of economic goals does not necessarily mean that social and 
environmental concerns have to be eschewed by companies. Clearly many Anglo-American companies 
have policies on corporate social responsibility. 
43  M.N. Young, M.W. Peng, D. Ahlstrom, G.D. Bruton and Y. Jiang, ‘Corporate Governance in 
Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective’ (2008) 45 Journal of 
Management Studies 196 at 211. 
44  S. Tenev, C. Zhang and L. Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: 
Building the Institutions of Modern Market, Washington, DC, World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation (2002) pp.2–3. 
45  See Statistics of China Securities Regulatory Commission, September 2014 available via 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306204/zqscyb/201410/t20141028_262444.htm (accessed on  
4th November 2014); see also J. Liu, ‘CSRC: State Owned and Controlled listed Company own market 
capitalisation of 16 Trillian RMB (证监会：国有控股上市公司总市值 16万亿)’ (2014) 4th November, 
China Economics Weekly.  
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between ownership and control in the current Chinese corporate governance scheme.46 
When SOEs are listed, they are predominately owned and controlled by central or 
regional governments, with at least 50 per cent (and usually more) of their shares held 
by government entities. The State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) acts as the largest shareholder, and the chairman of the board of directors is 
usually a representative of the management of SASAC who will consult with the board 
and nominate the directors of SOEs.47 The decisions made by the board will be based 
significantly on what are the interests of the largest shareholder. SASAC’s mandate is 
to “own” these listed companies and direct them in the interests of the public. SASAC 
is the ally of these large companies, and it seeks to improve managerial competence 
and capability and increase the value of state-owned assets.48 
A limited liability company in China is required by Chinese Company Law 2005 to 
“have a supervisory board composed of no less than three members”,49 who are to 
supervise “the acts of the directors and senior executives performing their functions.”50 
A two-tier board structure is adopted in China which is similar to the German insider 
model.51  The Chinese Company Law has a series of stipulations upon employees’ 
participation and the membership of the board of directors must include representatives 
of the staff and workers of the company.52 Moreover, trade unions also play a crucial 
role in promoting the interests of employees in the Chinese corporate governance 
system carrying out their activities in such a way as to protect the lawful rights and 
interests of the staff.53 For SOEs, their top executives are normally appointed by the 
Communist Party (“the Party”) and government agencies and are all veteran socialist 
managers, government officials or Party secretaries.54 Apart from their directorship 
position, they normally have an official title within government that is endorsed by 
                                                 
46  L.H. Tan and J.Y. Wang, ‘Modeling an Efficient Corporate Governance System for China’s 
Listed State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy’ (2007) 7 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 143 at 147. 
47  J.F. Huchet and X. Richer, ‘China in Search of an Efficient Corporate Governance System: 
International Comparison and Lessons’, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot-Watt 
University, Edinburgh, Discussion Paper No 99/01 (11, Feb 1999). 
48  B. Naughton, ‘SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China’ (2008) 24 China Leadership 
Monitor 1 at 8.   
49  Article 51, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
50  Article 53(2), Chinese Company Law 2006.  
51  Centre for Financial Market Integrity, China Corporate Governance Survey (2007) at 8. 
52  Article 44 and Article 108, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
53  Article 18, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
54  A.G. Walder, ‘From Control to Ownership: China’s Managerial Revolution’ (2009) 7 
Management and Organization Review 19 at 31.  
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government, and this will be at a level that matches their company’s position. Many of 
them return to government positions after a stint as executives. The supervisory board, 
as an independent board, offers independent opinions on corporate decisions and 
monitors the directors’ executive management, while the board of directors makes the 
main decisions on the day-to-day operations of the company. It was shown in a recent 
survey carried out by the Chinese Centre of Corporate Governance, titled “Developing 
Effective Boards of Directors of SOEs”,55 that members of the supervisory board are 
encountering difficulties in performing their duties. They are civil servants, and their 
education levels and qualifications are normally lower than those of the directors on the 
main board.56 They also normally have limited knowledge about the company itself. 
Moreover, they are not independent from the board of directors for the following 
reason. It is not surprising in Chinese listed companies that internal directors and senior 
management teams have “guanxi” 57  (meaning “a close relationship”) with the 
supervisors, or sometimes individuals even act both as internal directors and 
supervisors (or part-time supervisors) on the supervisory board.58 
 
IV The Concept of Accountability in China 
 
Notwithstanding the use of the word “accountability” in the G20/OECD’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance,59 a document relied on by many developing nations in the 
construction of their corporate governance systems and also considered by the Chinese, 
accountability is, as mentioned earlier, an English word that does not have universal 
application, and appears to be difficult to translate. Even in English there are phrases or 
other words that are seen as conveying all or some elements of the meaning of 
accountability. Examples are “transparency,” “accepting responsibility” and “being 
                                                 
55  Chinese Centre for Corporate Governance and Chinese Academy of Social Science, Developing 
Effective Boards of Directors of SOEs (2005).  
56  Corporate Governance Research Group of Nan-kai University and Chinese Commission of 
Economy and Trade, The Internal Corporate Governance Survey of Chinese Listed Corporations (2005). 
57  For discussions on “guanxi” and Chinese corporate governance see U. Braendle, T. Casser and 
J. Noll, ‘Corporate Governance in China – Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?’ (2005) 
16 Business Strategy Review 42, T.W. Dunfee and D.E. Warrren, ‘Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative 
Analysis of Doing Business in China’ (2004) 32 Journal of Business Ethics 191. 
58  Y. Li, ‘Comparative Studies on Supervisory Board of Limited Corporations’ in S. Shen (ed.) 
Essays on International Commercial Law II, Beijing: Law Publishing (2002) p.265 (in Chinese). 
59  G20/OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, at 51 and accessible at:  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed on 15th September 
2015). 
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answerable”.60 The word has been difficult to translate into other languages, as the 
concepts that it conveys in English are not readily transferable through another 
language.  
 
A. Elements of Accountability within Chinese Company Law  
 
In order to address the issue of whether the notion of “accountability” or a functional 
equivalent of it exists in Chinese corporate governance, elements of accountability will 
be discussed in this section. Based on the four stages disused in the last section 
including information disclosure, explaining and justifying, questioning and evaluating 
and the imposition of consequences, we can observe, despite lacking a well-developed 
accountability notion, certain elements of board accountability embedded within 
current corporate law legislation.  
 
As for the disclosure of information, it is clear from Article 46 of the Company Law 
2005 that the board of directors shall be accountable to the board of shareholders, and 
shall exercise the functions and powers to report on its work to the board of 
shareholders. Section 33 provides that shareholders shall have the right to examine the 
resolutions of the meetings of both the board of directors and the board of supervisors 
as well as financial and accounting reports. Furthermore, section 37 states that the 
shareholders meeting shall exercise the functions and powers to consider and approve 
reports of the board of directors and other company proposals such as  annual financial 
budgets and final accounts, profit distribution plans and plans for making up losses. 
Section 97 gives the shareholders right to examine minutes of the meetings of the board 
of directors, 61  minutes of the meetings of the board of supervisors, and to give 
suggestions for or inquire about the operation of the company. Specifically on the issue 
of questioning, the director is to attend the shareholders’ meeting as a non-voting 
                                                 
60  See M. Bovens, ‘Two concepts of accountability’ (2010) 33(5) West European Politics 946 at 
946 and referring to R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Washington, DC, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2001) at 3–6; D. Dunn and J. Legge, ‘US Local Government Managers and the 
complexity of Responsibility and Accountability in Democratic Governance’ (2000) 11 Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 73 at 74; A. Ebrahimi ‘The Many Faces of Nonprofit 
Accountability’ Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2010 at 3, and available at: 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-069.pdf (accessed on 3rd April 2014). 
61  Based on section 48 of Chinese Company Law, the board of directors shall keep minutes of its 
decisions on the matters under its consideration. The directors present at the meeting shall sign the 
minutes of the meeting. 
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attendee and accept inquiries from the shareholders if he or she is required to attend.62 
Thus the Chinese law does provide provisions that allow for a degree of questioning, 
evaluating, explaining and justifying.  The Company Law also imposes consequences 
in some situations where directors account and are found wanting or in situations where 
they fail to be accountable. For example, if directors breach their duties they can be 
held liable to pay compensation in respect of losses to the company.63  
 
While the company law legislation in China does include elements of accountability, it 
does not carry a well-rounded notion of accountability or an equivalent.  Despite the 
significance of the topic itself, the aim of this article is not focused on how to promote 
board accountability, but to ascertain what accountability does exist and how the 
concept could be fostered. Before examining Chinese law any further it is critical that 
a commonly understood and recognised Chinese version of the notion be proposed first.  
 
B. Language Issues 
 
In this part of the paper we examine the Chinese words that have been translated by the 
Chinese as “accountability” or “accountable” and those Chinese words that have been 
used to translate the same English words in Chinese documents addressing corporate 
governance and corporate law issues, in order to secure a well-rounded picture of how 
the concept of accountability is perceived in China. This includes consideration of 
documents which are translated from English into Chinese to ascertain which Chinese 
word(s) has been used to translate “accountable” as well as Chinese documents, 
including reports of companies, that have been translated into English and that have 
used the word “accountable” or “accountability”. It has been necessary for translations 
both so that non-Chinese readers might understand Chinese corporations’ reports and 
other documents, including Chinese legislation, and Chinese readers can get some 
handle on the relevance of accountability.  
 
The discussion seeks to examine how the Chinese view accountability in the field of 
corporate governance in particular, and to investigate whether the Chinese words 
                                                 
62 Section 150, Chinese Company Law 2006.  
63 Section 149, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
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convey the meaning that is encapsulated in the English usage. This linguistic approach 
in ascertaining if there is a term used for corporate governance accountability is 
essential in studying and understanding corporate governance in China and the notion 
of accountability, and it is particularly useful for contributing to the development of 
corporate governance, such as the drafting of the next version of the Chinese corporate 
governance code. The need for an updated code is becoming exceptionally relevant in 
light of the financial crisis of 2008 and due to the age of the existing one.  
 
In relation to accountability in general, it has been said that there is diversity in norms 
and practices among nations and across cultures.64 However, the same commentators 
also note that accountability is “a universal feature of social life that inevitably arises 
from the norm-enforcement needs of groups and organizations”, and that it affects 
nearly all decisions that are made by people.65 Other commentators assert that the 
“accountability of conduct remains a trans-historical and trans-cultural feature of 
human sociality.”66 While Amir Licht argues that it is clearly not a universal norm of 
governance,67 in several Chinese documents that have been published and translated 
into English the word “accountable” is used. Article 46 of the Company Law 2005, the 
primary Chinese legislation governing companies, states: “The board of directors shall 
be accountable to the shareholders [sic] assembly and exercise the following functions 
and powers (董事会对股东会负责，行使下列职权)”. This is the translation from the 
official website of “The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of 
China”.68 “Accountability” is used in other translations of Chinese documents in other 
corporate contexts. For instance, paragraph 42 of the English translation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China provides that: “The board of 
directors shall be made accountable to shareholders (董事会向股东大会负责).”69 The 
                                                 
64  J. Lerner and P. Tetlock, “Accountability and Social Cognition” (1994) 1 Encyclopedia of 
Human Behavior 1 at 2, 10 and referred to in A. Licht, “Accountability and Corporate Governance,” 2002 
at 22 and accessible at http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
65  Ibid. 
66  G. Semin and A. Manstead, “Accountability of Conduct: A Social Psychological Analysis” 
(1983) and referred to in J. Lerner and P. Tetlock, “Accountability and Social Cognition” (1994) 1 
Encyclopedia of Human Behavior 1 at 1–2. 
67  A. Licht, “Accountability and Corporate Governance,” 2002 at 24, 32 and accessible at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
68  Available via http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384124.htm 
(accessed 8 July 2015). 
69  Issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 7 January 2001 and accessible at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
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same Code states that the supervisory board is to be accountable to all of the 
shareholders (上市公司监事会应向全体股东负责).70 The word “accountable” is used 
on each occasion to translate the same Chinese word, fuze负责.  
 
In the Chinese version of the “Corporate Governance Assessment Summary Report on 
the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012” published by Protiviti/China and the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the word “accountability” translates the Chinese 
words “wenze jizhi (问责机制)”, when referring to establishing accountability and 
ensuring information transparency.71 An examination of the Chinese version of the 
OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles of 2004 shows that “accountability” has 
been translated differently on three occasions. In Section 2 E 2 of the Principles 
(providing that “Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and 
the board from accountability”) it is translated as “wenze (问责)”. Meanwhile, it is 
translated as “shoutuo zeren (受托责任)” (which can be directly translated as “the 
responsibility of trustees”) in Section VI (“…the board’s accountability to the company 
and the shareholders”), and as “wenze xing (问责性)” (xing means nature of72) in Part 
I of the Annotations (“Transparent and efficient markets serve to discipline market 
participants and to promote accountability”).  
  
It can be seen from corporate governance codes, statutory provisions, government 
policy papers, CSR reports, and corporate governance reports, that the term 
“accountability” has been used to represent a number of different Chinese words or 
phrases and various words or phrases have been translated into English as 
“accountability.” This suggests that the concept of accountability from a Chinese 
perspective is not clear.  
 
                                                 
70  Issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 7 January 2001, article 59, and 
accessible at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
71  Protiviti/China and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Corporate Governance Assessment 
Summary Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012” at 1: 
http://www.protiviti.co.uk/China-en/Documents/CN-en-2012-Corporate-Governance-Survey-
Report.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
72  In this case, “wenze” is used as a verb rather than a noun. It is a Chinese linguistic rule that the 
verb will be changed to a noun by putting “xing” after the verb, e.g. 超越（性）.   
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Purely from the material that we have looked at above, “wenze”, “wenze zhi” and “zeren 
zhuijiu zhidu” are the three words or phrases that appear to be translated as 
“accountability” or “accountability system” most often. While “zhi” or “zhidu” can be 
translated as “system” without controversy, it is interesting to consider “wenze” and 
“zeren zhuijiu” in more detail.  
 
The term “wenze” can be viewed as a combination of two individual words (wen and 
ze). “Wen” is a word that can either be used as a verb or a noun, and is more 
appropriately used as the former here. When used as a verb it means “enquire, ask, 
interrogate or examine,” while “ze”, a word that also can either be used as a verb or a 
noun, and which is more appropriately used as the latter here, means “responsibility”. 
These two words together can deliver the meaning of the process of one party enquiring 
of another about his or her responsibilities, 73  whereas “zeren zuijiu” means 
investigating someone’s responsibility in order to ascertain if they are liable from a 
legal viewpoint. While “wenze zhidu” can be seen as a process of enquiring about 
responsibility and identifying possible responsibilities of someone, “zeren zhuijiu 
zhidu” puts more emphasis on the process of ascertaining whether there is any legal 
liability in relation to the responsibilities undertaken. Looking at the four stages 
involved in the accountability of boards in Anglo-American systems74 which were 
identified earlier, namely providing accurate information, explaining and justifying 
actions taken in relation to responsibilities, questioning and evaluating the reasons 
provided for the board’s actions, and the imposition of consequences, no Chinese term 
accommodates all aspects of accountability as it is understood in English. Each word 
tends to have a specialised meaning or focus that fails to be as encompassing as the 
English word. For example, “wenze” puts an emphasis on enquiry and the need for 
explanations, while “zeren zhuijiu” puts emphasis on the consequences, namely, 
liability.75   
                                                 
73  In Chinese grammar, some strings of characters can be used as single words in some contexts, 
but are separable in others. Many English intransitive verbs are translated by verb+noun compounds, 
such as 问责 (“wenze”, “to be accountable”; literally “to enquire about the responsibilities”), which may 
be regarded as single lexical words, although the two parts can become separated by aspect markers. 
74  A. Keay and J. Loughrey, “Board Accountability in Corporate Governance” (2015) 35 Legal 
Studies 252. 
75  It is fair to say that there are many words that are often seen as synonyms for accountability in 
English, and “liability” is one of them: M. Dubnick & K. Yang, ‘The Pursuit of Accountability: Promise, 
Problems, and Prospects’ in D.C. Menzel & H.L. White (edns), The State of Public Administration: 
Issues, Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge  2011), 171 at 185. . Some see liability as a dimension 
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Having said this, it is argued that like the English word “accountability”, the Chinese 
word “wenze” accommodates reasonably broad dimensional connotations and certainly 
broader than “zhuijiu”. This is affirmed by the fact that there are derivations of wen        
(问) in many other words, such as “jieda 解答” (ask, enquire), “xunwen 询问” 
(question), “shenxun审讯” (examine), “ganyu 干预” (manage) and even “zhuijiu 追究” 
(hold responsible). These derivations are related to some elements of accountability as 
the term is perceived in English.  
   
C. “Wenze” 
 
“Wenze” appears to be a critical word in two respects. It is used in the Chinese to 
translate accountability and it is translated by Chinese writers and in reports as 
accountability. Thus, we now move to discussing “wenze” in the context of the literature 
surrounding corporate governance and business management to determine its scope and 
application. In particular we investigate the term “wenze zhi”, which, as mentioned 
earlier, can be translated as “accountability system”.  
 
Professor Chen Zhibin, Professor of Accounting from Nanjing University, has argued 
that “wenze zhi” is a system implementing balanced rights and responsibility 
mechanisms via an institutionalised questioning process.76 He refers to this process as 
a “wenze system” and it includes the following: a rigorous scientific assessment of 
rights and fulfilling the corresponding obligations; noticing irresponsible actions and 
decisions in a timely fashion; and pursuing appropriate punishments based on breaches 
of duties. He described the “wenze system” as one that clarifies and balances rights and 
responsibilities through a systematic enquiry process in order to minimise risks from 
the actions of internal management.77  
 
                                                 
of accountability: J. Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of ‘Multiple 
Accountabilities Disorder’’ (2005) 65 Public Administration Review 94 at 96. 
76  Z. Chen, ‘Effective Enforcement of Accountability and Internal Control’ (2004) 7 Accounting 
Research 9; see also Z. Chen and Z. Chen, 2004, ‘Accountability and Validity of Renovation Structure 
in State-owned Enterprises’, in S. Cheng and C. Liu, Management Sciences and Global Strategies in the 
21st Century (Macao: Macao University of Science and Technology) 2004. 
77  Z. Chen, ‘Effective Enforcement of Accountability and Internal Control’ (2004) 7 Accounting 
Research 9.  
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In one of the most influential newspapers in China, the People’s Daily (人民日报
Renmin Ribao), it has been argued by Professor Li Weian, one of the most eminent 
Chinese scholars in the field of corporate governance, that the key issue in promoting 
corporate governance is accountability.78 He explicitly used the word “wenze” when he 
accommodated the idea of accountability in his argument. He also argued that “real 
accountability in corporate governance” is a process of “collective decision making 
with individualized accountability”.79 This accommodates the notion of boards and 
board members being accountable both collectively and individually, with 
individualised liabilities. For instance, individual directors can be held liable if they 
breach their duties when acquiescing to a particular course of action taken by the 
board.80 In contemporary research on corporate governance in China and elsewhere, 
“personal accountability”, together with stewardship, are core elements of internal 
control and may be more important than performance measurement, efficiency or even 
profit. 81  That also reflects the understanding of the “wenze system” in China in 
highlighting the importance of “mingxi bing jiehe quanze (明晰并结合权责 )” 
(clarifying what a person has done but also connecting the rights of the person to his or 
her responsibility). 
 
 Shuqing Guo, former Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), pointed out in his speech at the 10th Corporate Governance Forum that 
“enhancing oversight and accountability of controlling shareholders, directors, 
supervisors and executives” is instrumental to improving corporate governance, which 
will in turn promote the competitiveness of Chinese companies. The Chinese word that 
                                                 
78  W. Li, ‘Corporate Responsibility and Importance of Establishing  an Efficient Corporate 
Governance System Construction’ People’s Daily, 6th November 2008; （李维安, 企业履责,制度建设
是关键，人民日报）2008-11-6, available via paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/.../content_133517.htm 
79  W. Li, ‘Corporate Responsibility and Importance of Establishing  an Efficient Corporate 
Governance System 李维安, 企业履责,制度建设是关键’, 6th November 2008, page 5; the Chinese 
version of the article used the words “geren wenze 个人问责” to deliver the idea of individualised 
accountability. 
80  See Articles 147–149 of Chinese Company Law 2005; see also some reported cases such as Tan 
Mo 0, Li Mo 1, Li Mo 2, D Danwei v Liulan (People’s Highest Court 2013); Shenyang Tekesi Company 
v Zhang Mo (Shanghai Second Intermediate Court 2011 No. 1836); Tan Hui v Li Jia (Beijing Second 
Intermediate Court 2011 No. 16710); Shenzhen Long Digit Control Technique Company v. Li Da 
(Shenzhen Bao’an District Court, 2011 No. 1025); Ningbo Dahongying Medical Company v Shen 
Yongren (Zhejiang Province High Court, 2009 No, 1212); Shanghai Weigela Printing Equipment 
Company v Andreas Albert & Uhlemayer (Shanghai First Intermediate Court 2009 No. 33). 
81  M.J. Jones, ‘Internal Control, Accountability and Corporate Governance: Medieval and Modern 
Britain Compared’ (2008) 21 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 1052.  
22 
 
Guo used and was translated as accountability was “wenze (问责)”.82 This adds to what 
we have already documented concerning the Chinese words used to indicate 
accountability, and leads us to think that “wenze” or “wenze zhi” have been broadly 
used in the domain of corporate governance and accounting by academics and 
government officers when trying to establish a link, or clarify the differences, between 
rights, responsibility and liability.  
 
It is commonly agreed that “wenze” is critical to promoting the corporate governance 
system in China after the financial crisis of 2008.83 However, wenze does not cover the 
full ambit of accountability, as the word was defined earlier and is used in the English 
sense, in relation to the elements of disclosure and justification by an accountor. The 
emphasis of “wenze” is very much on the role of the accountees and what they should 
be doing by way of making enquiry concerning the actions of the accountor, rather than 
the role of the accountor in reporting and justifying what has been done.  
 
It might be possible, due to the multiple derivations of the term, for a “wenze system” 
to be developed along with the Chinese corporate governance system so as to secure a 
sound and effective accountability system, remembering that many Chinese sources 
have referred to the need for accountability in corporate governance. The “wenze 
system” can be considered from a few perspectives, including consideration of the ones 
who engage in “wenze”, namely the accountees (those who enquire and then assess 
explanations given to them), and the content, mechanism and scope of “wenze.”  
 
The main constituents who should be seen as the ones to whom accountability is owed 
would be shareholders. This follows from Article 46 of Chinese Company Law 2005 
and other uses of the word where it is able to be translated as accountability. The 
possible reasons for enquiry within the “wenze system” may include various issues such 
                                                 
82  Chairman Guo Shuqing’s Speech at the 10th Corporate Governance Forum: ‘Corporate 
Governance and Capital Market Sophistication Are Mutually Reinforcing’ available via 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201208/t20120815_213799.htm and Chinese 
version of the speech is available via 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/bgt/xwdd/201112/t20111219_203915.htm  (both accessed on 8th 
July 2015) 
83  X. Gong, ‘Perplexity and Countermeasures of Judicial Intervention in Corporate Governance in 
China – New Thinking under the Background of Financial Crisis of Wall Street’(2009) 27 Tribune of 
Political Science and Law 8. 
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as checking resolutions and decisions made by the board, ascertaining decisions 
concerning the directors’ remuneration, monitoring the discharging of duties of 
directors, or other general strategic management policies. For example, based on Article 
97 of Chinese Company Law 2005 there are several accountability mechanisms 
provided, such as the fact that the shareholders of a company limited by shares are given 
the right to “look into the articles of association of the company, the register of 
shareholders…minutes of shareholders’ general meetings, resolutions of meetings of 
the board of directors and the board of supervisors… financial and accounting reports, 
and to make suggestions or inquiries about the business operations of the company”.  
 
The procedure of “wenze” will also be regulated by the Chinese Company Law 2005, 
especially through stipulations in relation to shareholders’ meetings and the liability 
and dismissal of directors.84 Therefore, the subject body, content and procedure of a 
“wenze” system in the context of corporate governance will work together to facilitate 
an effective accountability mechanism as far as China is concerned. This will provide 
investors with the means to query and assess the actions of the board and its committees 
in order to make them accountable for their decisions and actions. However, thus far 
this “wenze system” has not been introduced in legislative documents in China. 
Hitherto, the ideas of “wenze” or a “wenze system” are only discussed academically or 
within the domain of administrative law or administrative management. It will be 
positive and useful for China to introduce the system in relation to corporate governance 
in order to make important issues such as directors’ duties and shareholders’ rights 
subject to more effective and logical enforcement. Overall a wenze system would 
enhance corporate governance in China. 
 
D. The Empirical Position 
 
We have already noted that there are elements of accountability of boards in the 
provisions of the Company Law 2005. What the paper does now is to consider whether 
accountability has been embraced in the corporate governance sphere. In this respect 
we have considered some of the corporate reports and other documents published by 
Chinese companies that are available on the official websites of the company in order 
                                                 
84  See Articles 98–107, 146 and 149, Chinese Company Law 2005.  
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to identify the extent to which the ‘law on the books’ has been translated into practice, 
how has the English term accountability has been accommodated in practice and to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the usage of accountability. We believe these corporate 
reports, which are available via official website for presentation purposes and to provide 
disclosure of corporate governance issues, and which include CSR, financial reporting 
and integrated reports, are trustworthy and reflect the genuine usage of the terms in 
companies when considering their corporate governance structure and corporate 
management strategies. These reports are normally professionally drafted, internally 
and externally scrutinised and translated by experts. There are, in our opinion, no 
documents available that are more reliable or can better illuminate how the notion of 
accountability has been currently adopted and employed in Chinese companies, and 
they could well be more accurate than data obtained from interviews as they are 
available to the public and able to be assessed widely. Both SOEs and non-SOEs from 
various industries were carefully selected in order to ensure that we consider data from 
a balanced range of companies. This is one of few ways that could enable one to 
ascertain what the position is in relation to corporate governance practice. This section, 
rather than a survey on corporate documents and academic writings on the notion of 
accountability, problems, misinterpretations, and inadequacy of how has value of 
accountability been enforced and considered in practice, aims to identify the gap 
between the notion of systematic accountability on the one hand, and the realisation of 
the term in practice, on the other, and endeavours to fill in this gap both here and in the 
rest of the paper.    
 
We chose a number of large listed companies from different types of industries 
including the energy, telecommunications, transportation, banking, motor vehicle, 
pharmaceutical, airline, insurance, food,  emerging technology sectors and mixed 
industry in order to determine how,  to what extent  and in what ways the notion of 
accountability has been embraced by companies. We studied both the Chinese and 
English versions of these reports in order to ascertain how relevant are the Chinese 
terms that we proposed in relation to the “wenze” or “wenze zhi (system)” to 
accountability in practice.  First, we examined the reports of SOEs. The Annual Report 
and Account 2014 titled “Reform, Transformation, Management” of the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group), a super-large petroleum and 
petrochemical company in China and ranked second in the Fortune Global 500 in 2014, 
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reported on the issues surrounding “accountability and auditing” alongside matters such 
as the work of the boards of directors and remuneration in the corporate governance 
sub-section of the report. It is provided that accountability should be achieved through 
accurate financial reporting with full responsibilities being imposed for false and 
misleading statements with internal control framework and self-assessment measures 
being put in place to support this. 85  The CSR Report 2014 of the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), ranked fourth in the Fortune Global 500 in 2013 
provided that the company integrates “economic, environmental and social objectives 
into performance evaluations of senior executives” who are “accountable for HSE 
misconduct” when discussing stakeholders engagement, particularly on how to 
consolidate safety and environmental protection”.86  
 
When reporting on the management of health and safety risk, the 2010 Sustainability 
Report of the China Ocean Shipping Group (COSCO) mentioned the implementation 
of a “safe production accountability system” when discussing management of health 
and safety risk as part of its risk management system, and this was stated to be one of 
the company’s goals.87 In the same report, the notion of accountability is also embedded 
as one of the performance indicators for the company’s board88.  
 
Since food safety has become one of the topics that attracted much attention, especially 
after the San Lu Milk Powder scandal involving 700 tons of San Lu baby milk powder 
being contaminated with melamine to meet company standards for the protein content 
in order to achieve the short-term interests of the shareholders, we also examined the 
reports of one of the biggest food manufacturing companies, China Agri-Industries 
Holdings Limited (or China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs 
Corporation/COFCO). In the corporate governance report contained within the 2013 
Annual Report, it is disclosed that “the company recognises the importance of corporate 
transparency and accountability” in order to achieve a high standard of corporate 
governance practices and an accountable management framework in order to enhance 
                                                 
85  The Chinese word used here for accountability was “wenze (问责)”. 
86  Here, the word “accountability” translated the Chinese phrase “wenze jizhi (问责机制)”. 
87  The corresponding Chinese phrase used here for accountability system was “wenze zhi (问责
制)”. 
88  The corresponding Chinese word to accountability was “zeren（责任）”. 
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the interests of shareholders. The notion of accountability was also discussed in relation 
to the audit function as part of the directors’ responsibilities.89  
 
In the CSR Report 2011 of China Southern Power Grid (CSG), it is mentioned that 
accountability is regarded as a core value and the accountee in the accountability 
process is every stakeholder.90  In the Baosteel Group CSR Report 2012, the term 
“Economic accountability audit” was used to discuss one of the auditing systems.91 In 
the same report, the accountability system that is provided for is regarded as “the basic” 
for a close-loop management mode to combat corruption.92  The Interim Report of the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China employed the term “operational management 
accountability” as part of an attempt to improve IT management.93  
 
In order to enhance transparency, it is emphasized in the annual report 2013 of Shanghai 
Automobile and Industrial Corporation that policies of accountability for significant 
errors made in information disclosure have been introduced.94 In the annual report of 
China Mobile Limited 2014, when discussing, internal audit in the corporate 
governance section of the annual report, it is reported that the company promoted 
accountability in order to hold officers accountable, and in appropriate cases impose 
penalties 95 . China Merchants Holding Limited, developed from the first private 
company that was registered in 1872 during the Qing dynasty, is one of the companies 
that we studied that is involved in a mixture of industries including transportation, 
finance and real estate. In its annual report of 2014 titled “Growing from Strength to 
Strength”, accountability was used as one of the 16 principles of corporate governance 
that regulates the company’s life. Accountability was important as “the Board is 
committed to providing shareholders with a balanced and understandable assessment 
of the Company’s financial performance, position, and prospects via announcement of 
its quarterly, interim and full year financial results.”96  
                                                 
89  The corresponding Chinese phrase used here for accountability system was “wenze zhi (问责
制)”and “wenze (问责)”. 
90  Here the corresponding phrase in Chinese is “fuze de duidai (负责的对待)”. 
91  The Chinese version of the document used the phrase “jingji zeren shenji (经济责任审计)” 
92  The Chinese version of the report used the word “zeren zuijiu tixi (责任追究体系)”. 
93  The phrase “guanli zeren zhi (管理责任制)” was used in the Chinese version of the report 
94  The equivalent word in Chinese report is wenze (问责). 
95  The phrase “wenze (问责)” was used  in the Chinese version of the report 
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Apart from SOEs, we also observed some non-state owned companies in order to look 
at how the notion of accountability has been adopted where there is less impact from 
administrative governance. In the Corporate Governance report of Huawei, “the CEO 
accountability system” was mentioned under the leadership of board of directors and 
“clear authorization and accountability of responsibilities” was highlighted as a 
characteristic of “a well-established governance structure”.  Moreover, Part 2 of CSR 
report 2014 of China Minsheng Bank discussed the transformation on nature and 
attitudes towards CSR from being purely voluntary and philanthropic responsibilities 
to the expected responsibilities of board from their stakeholders with possible liabilities 
in order to disclose corporate actions towards stakeholders, including some of them 
need special attention in China including small and medium enterprises, non-state-
owned enterprises, rural community, employees, environment  and public welfare.97 In 
the corporate governance report of 2014 of Ping An Insurance Company of China, the 
importance of the “formulation and implementation of an accountability system for 
major errors,” which had been introduced in 2010, was reaffirmed. When discussing 
“the assessment and evaluation of the remuneration system”, the “accountability results 
are closely linked to the long-term and short-term award and appointment and removal 
of cadres” which is closely related to the fourth stage of  the notion of accountability 
discussed in Part II. Furthermore, “a risk prevention and control accountability system” 
was established in relation to “Investment Risk Management”.98  
 
In the corporate governance report (contained within the annual report) of Shanghai 
Fosun Pharmaceutical company, it is emphasises that “the board believes that high 
corporate governance standards are essential in providing a framework for the Group 
to safeguard the interests of shareholders and to enhance corporate value and 
accountability”.99 In the annual report of Hainan Airline, the notion of “accountability” 
was employed as a means to promote safety management.100 
                                                 
97  The phrase “dandang (担当)”  was used  in the Chinese version of the report which means 
“undertake responsibility voluntarily” 
98  The Chinese version of the report used the word “zeren zuijiu zhidu (责任追究制度)”, “zeren 
zhi (责任制)”, “wenze (问责)”. 
99  The phrase “wenze du (问责度)” was used in the Chinese version of the report and du means 
degree of in Chinese.  
100  The phrase “wenze (问责)” was used in the Chinese version of the report. 
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In addition there are a number of statements by Chinese scholars that indicate that there 
is some kind of accountability going on in the corporate governance field.  For example, 
Li Weian, as indicated above, has indicated that there is accountability in the Chinese 
system. Shi has argued that weak accountability is regarded as one of the major 
corporate governance problems in China. 101  Zhu has discussed the existence of 
accountability and identified problems and the necessity of effective enforcement of an 
accountability system. 102 Sun and Tobin have noted that Chinese companies enhanced 
their accountability after cross-listing in foreign stock exchanges.103  
 
We can see from the discussions above that accountability has been adopted in various 
ways to deliver the notion of responsibilities which are accompanied by possible 
liability. Accountability is widely used in various reports and in academic literature in 
the area of corporate governance. As for the corporate reports, the notion of 
accountability is mostly embedded within the CSR report, or corporate governance 
section of the annual report. The term was employed to disclose that the boards are 
made responsible in relation to various parties including shareholders and stakeholders 
and to demonstrate a clear mechanism of liabilities with internal control, especially 
when the accountability system was discussed and used in relation to the auditing 
system, risk management and product safety management. The term accountability was 
used to deliver the meaning of one, or more than one, stage(s) of the four stages of 
accountability discussed in Section II, but not all of them. The concern is that the 
Chinese equivalent of accountability in these documents is not consistent. The 
understanding of the nature and scope of the notion of accountability in both the 
corporate and academic world is also inconsistent, incomplete and far from being 
systematic.  
 
E. A “Wenze System” 
 
                                                 
101   C. Shi, Political Determinants of Corporates Governances in China (Abingdon: Routledge) 
pp.134-136. 
102  Y. Zhu, The Structure and Efficiency the Board Accountability System (董事问责：制度结构
于效率) (Beijing: Law Press) (2012) p.18. 
103  L. Sun, & D.Tobin, ‘International Listing as a Mechanism of Commitment to More Credible 
Corporate Governance Practices: the case of the Bank of China (Hong Kong)’ (2005) 13 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 81. 
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Accountability is clearly not something that is limited to corporate governance in either 
Anglo-American jurisdictions or in China. Political reforms through the introduction of 
an accountability system, that is, a “wenze system,” were introduced in China in order 
to make government officials more responsive to societal demands and more 
accountable for their performance as civil servants. Government institutions have been 
established for this purpose, including legislative oversight committees, supervision 
committees, party discipline committees, and internal administration reconsideration 
procedures. An accountability system for government officials (“ganbu wenze zhi 干部
问责制”) is regarded as the most important of these.104 Government officials will face 
an enquiry process which may lead to tough penalties or dismissal. The importance 
placed on the enquiry process within this “wenze system” is regarded as the result of 
government officials not being accountable for their decisions. The development of the 
market economy makes the government’s accountability reforms particularly important 
as China becomes increasingly open and diverse.  
 
In relation to corporate governance, it is recognised that in Chinese listed companies, 
directors’ responsibilities need to be clarified in order to make their enforceability more 
credible. The professionalism and competitiveness of Chinese directors on both the 
executive and supervisory boards has been questioned, and reforms through corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate law changes have been recommended.105 These 
problems are widely recognised in China from the perspective of government officials, 
especially in relation to the actions of directors in SOEs.  
 
                                                 
104  S. Zhao, ‘The China Model of Development: Can it Replace Western Model of Modernization?’ 
in S.P. Hsu, Y. Wu and S. Zhao (eds.) In Search of China’s Development Model: Beyond the Beijing 
Consensus (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011) 45 at 52.    
105  See L. Chun, The Governance Structure of Chinese Firms, Heidelberg and London, Springer 
(2009); J. Yang, J. Chi and M. Young, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in China’ (2011) Asian-
Pacific Economic Literature 15; N. Rajagopalan and Y. Zhang, ‘Corporate Governance Reform in China 
and India: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2008) 51 Business Horizons 55; Y. Cheung, P. Jiang, P. 
Limpaphayom and T. Lu, ‘Does Corporate Governance Matter in China’ (2008) 19 China Economic 
Review 460; H. Sami, J. Wang and H. Zhou, ‘Corporate Governance and Operating Performance of 
Chinese Listed Firms’ (2011) 20 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 106; L. 
Miles and Z. Zhang, ‘Improving Corporate Governance in State-Owned Corporations in China: Which 
Way Forward?’ (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 213; S. Li, ‘China’s (Painful) Transition 
from Relation-based to Rule-based Governance: When and How, not If and Why’ (2013) 21 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 567; G. Xu, T. Zhou, B. Zeng and J. Shi, ‘Directors’ Duties in 
China’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 57. 
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The concept of a wenze accountability system gives us opportunities to develop “wenze” 
in a manner that will benefit the development of the Chinese corporate governance 
system as an economic model, which is the direction China is heading. Unlike the 
essence of “wenze” itself, the wenze system could include dimensions with a rather wide 
scope relating to a process of balancing rights and responsibilities through enquiry and 
disclosure. The system requires directors to be accountable to the company and it 
includes, in a logical order, the following three broad dimensions:106 the directors being 
responsible and exercising due diligence (“jinze 尽责”or “lüze 履责”); directors 
clarifying and providing information concerning their responsibility and setting 
standards, explaining, analysing and justifying the responsibility they have been given 
(“mingze 明责”); and “wenze” in a narrow sense, focusing on enquiry relative to the 
actions of the accountor (“wenze 问责”). The realisation and enforcement of the process 
of “wenze” does imply these dimensions, and these three related aspects have been 
practically and widely used to explain the wenze system. For example, it is argued by 
Wang Tie, Party secretary of Xinyang City, that Party committees and governments of 
all levels should understand the close relationship between clarifying their 
responsibilities (“mingze 明责”), exercising due diligence (“jinze 尽责” or “loze 履
责”) and making enquiries concerning the actions of the accountor (“wenze 问责”) in 
order to build a harmonious and peaceful society through the wenze system.107 Another 
example is that the accountability issue is emphasized in the Guidelines for the Internal 
Control of Recommendations for Business drafted by the CSRC, which put forward 
requirements in relation to systems concerning due diligence, working papers, work 
diaries, internal examinations and continuous inspections as specified in the Measures 
for the Administration of Securities Issuance and Listing Recommendations for 
Business.108 The accountability system is introduced in Section 5 (3) through three 
components and dimensions including “mingze (明责)”, “jinze (尽责)” and “wenze (问
                                                 
106  The “wenze” system is able to accommodate a number of dimensions. “Ze” is the noun and 
“wen”, “ming”, “bao”, “cheng” and “xi” are verbs; this is an accurate way to compose a word in Chinese 
grammar. These four phrases can be regarded as four dimensions of the “wenze” system. 
107  Speech by Wang Tie, party secretary of Xinyang City on 17th August 2009; available via 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3faf53b50100es7n.html (accessed on 4th November 2014). 
108  Guidelines for the Internal Control of Recommendation Business (保荐业务内部控制指引) 
www.csrc.gov.cn/.../P020110621654377810539.doc (accessed on 4th November 2014). 
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责)”.109 In relation to directors, Mr. Yin Jiaxu, Chairman of the Board of the China 
North Industries Group Corporation, which ranks 152nd on the 2014 Fortune Global 500 
list, argued in a group discipline committee training meeting in July to August 2014 in 
Beijing that Party committee members and members of the board at all levels should 
clarify their responsibilities, exercise due diligence with respect to their responsibilities, 
and be accountable for their decisions.110 It is highlighted that, in order to enforce and 
implement the accountability system, “mingze (明责)” is the foundation, “lüze (履责)” 
is the key to ensure the achievement of assigned tasks, and “wenze (问责)” can be 
regarded as the safeguard.  
 
The logical flow of these three dimensions of a “wenze system” described above is 
important to bridge the expectation gap that exists between what is perceived as the 
roles to be played by the board of directors and the reality of actual board performance, 
something that is also needed in Anglo-American corporate governance.  
 
The broad scope of the “wenze system” seems to come close to covering the four stages 
of accountability discussed at the outset, because this system as developed in 
administrative management includes providing accurate information concerning its 
decisions and actions (“xize 析责”), explaining and justifying that for which it is 
responsible (“mingze 明责”), questioning and evaluating of the reasons provided by the 
board (“zhize 质责”) and the imposition of consequences (“chengze 惩责” or “baoze 
褒责”). 
 
This “wenze system” can be regarded as a trend that should be adopted in relation to 
Chinese corporate governance in order for China to develop its own unique 
accountability system based on a constantly changing and distinctive corporate 
governance model and one that is becoming close to economic governance. The 
proposed system could possibly be included within the next Code of Corporate 
                                                 
109  Section 5 (3) Guidelines for the Internal Control of Recommendation Business (保荐业务内部
控制指引). 
110  Yin Jiaxu emphasises in the Discipline Inspection Group Company 2014 Training Session: 
“Discipline should focus on fulfilling its oversight responsibilities (尹家绪在集团公司 2014年纪委书
记 培 训 班 上 强 调 ： 纪 委 要 聚 焦 主 业  履 行 好 监 督 责 任 )”, available via 
http://www.norincogroup.com.cn/cn/newsdetail.aspx?id=34423&type=1 (accessed on 4th November 
2014). 
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Governance for Listed Companies in China (the Code), the present one being arguably 
out of date as it was introduced in 2001.111  
 
Thus, it is not suggested here that the Anglo-American concept of accountability  should 
be transplanted to Chinese corporate governance. While scholarly understanding of 
legal translating, as a ubiquitous form of legal development, is fairly rudimentary,112 
what is clear is that when considering whether concepts that operate in one jurisdiction 
should be applied in another there can be difficulty in transplanting those concepts 
because of a variety of factors such as the political system, culture, history, law 
enforcement and socio-economics.113 Whether concepts, like accountability which is a 
value, can be transplanted is probably a matter that is likely to be subject to aspects of 
the same debate that exists with respect to the transplantation of legal rules. In line with 
the views espoused in relation to legal transplantation, some scholars, known as 
transferists, may argue that concepts like accountability are equally at home anywhere 
where there is human endeavour and community if the concept is a good and 
appropriate one, 114  while others, known as culturalists, might argue that it is not 
possible to effect a transplanting,115 as one cannot transport human meanings from one 
culture to another.116 If the successful legal transplant means using the imported legal 
rules in the same way that they are used in the home country subject to adaptions and 
local conditions,117 we submit that there is a middle ground where, as in this case, an 
accountability system can be developed that draws on the concept of accountability as 
                                                 
111  See N. Rajagopalan and Y. Zhang, ‘Corporate Governance Reform in China and India: 
Challenges and Opportunities’ (2008) 51 Business Horizons 55; L. Guo, C. Smallman and J. Radford, 
‘A Critique of Corporate Governance in China’ (2013) 55 International Journal of Law and Management 
257. 
112  H. Kanda & C.J. Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Directors’ Fiduciary Duty 
in Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 41 American Journal of Comparative Law 887 at 887. 
113  D. Clarke, ‘Lost in Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China’ (2006) and available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=913784 (accessed on 16th December 2015). 
114  For example, see A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1974); R. Small, “Towards a Theory of Contextual Transplants” 
(2005) 19 Emory International Law Review 1431 at 1431; D. Cabrelli and M. Siems, “Convergence, 
Legal Options and Transplants in Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative 
Analysis” (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 109 at 124. 
115  For example, see O. Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 
Modern Law Review 1 at 27; P. Legrand, “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants” (1997) 4 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 111; D. Cabrelli and M. Siems, “Convergence, Legal 
Options and Transplants in Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis” 
(2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 109 at 124-125. 
116  E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation (Minerva, 1991) at 175. 
117  H. Kanda & C.J. Milhaupt, ‘Re-examine Legal Transplants: The Directors’ Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 41 American Journal of Comparative Law 887 at 891. 
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provided for in other places, but at the same time one that meshes with China’s culture 
and politics and meets its specific needs in order to establish an accountability system 
with Chinese characteristics. If a concept that has been emphasised and developed in a 
foreign country is able to serve another country well or is able to contribute to the 
development of a country’s own application of the concept then the origin of the 
concept is not relevant.118 Pursuant to the middle ground approach we advocate it is not 
a problem if the recipient country’s appreciation of the original concept is flawed as the 
country will not be endeavouring to stick slavishly to it in any event, but developing 
what it feels is best and most suitable for its particular circumstances. 
 
It is argued that the development of this unique wenze system would reflect the fact that 
China is likely to develop its own form of accountability because the development of 
its corporate governance is affected by path dependence. This is a comparatively 
modern idea that originated in the 1980s, and it provides that an outcome or decision is 
shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it, as well as by 
other factors within the socio-economic context.119 While convergence theorists predict 
that countries, especially countries with weak legal systems, will adopt certain legal 
rules that have been demonstrably efficient in other jurisdictions, theorists who adhere 
to path dependence normally argue that divergence between systems will still exist 
because legal rules are shaped by pre-existing political and social forces.120 As part of 
the domestic legal and financial framework, a corporate law system has significant 
sources of path dependence, which include historical accidents as well as economic and 
political particulars of the domestic system. 121  The persistence of these sources 
significantly contributes to the stability of the domestic corporate governance system 
in any local socio-economic environment.  
 
                                                 
118  S. Zhuang, “Legal Transplantation in the People’s Republic of China: A Response to Alan 
Watson” [2006] European Journal of Law Reform 215 at 226; H. Xanthaki, ‘Legal Transplants in 
Legislation: Defusing the Trap’ (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 659 at 662. 
119  O.A. Hathaway, ‘The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’ (2001) 
Iowa Law Review 1, 103–104. 
120  K. Pistor, ‘Patterns of Legal Changes: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition 
Economies’ (2000) EBRD working paper 49/2000.  
121  L. A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and 
Ownership’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 127. 
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It is recognised that a “one size fits all” approach will not work because of the existence 
of path dependence.122 Countries with emerging markets should avoid simply copying 
legislation and codes implemented in mature markets as they are likely to be 
inappropriate. The most appropriate and effective regulatory framework will greatly 
depend on how evolved a country’s markets, legal system and governmental institutions 
are, as well as the nature of its history and culture. 123  Also of importance is the 
shareholding ownership structure for that is often unique to each nation and which 
presents its own unique agency problems that each country will normally have to 
confront. Deniz correctly points out that “copying a code from one country to another 
without analysing the details of a corporate governance system or considering the 
applicability to a specific country’s judicial system or ensuring effective enforcement, 
will not bring the expected benefit and reform to that country”.124  
Path dependence theory can be regarded as a theoretical base for the adoption of a 
notion of accountability with unique characteristics within a unique corporate 
governance model, taking into account a nation’s corporate law, enforcement process, 
shareholder structure, civil procedure, stage of economic development and other 
aspects including culture, history and traditions. The existing values present in a nation 
will block changes and generate path dependence. It has been argued by Bebchuk and 
Roe that the initial ownership structure in a country will directly influence the 
subsequent development of ownership structure and laws.125 Furthermore, they have 
developed the theory to suggest that interested parties possessing the power to influence 
ownership structure and corporate law will have both the incentive and the power to 
impede changes that might improve efficiency but are contrary to their private control 
interests.126 In China, the very high concentration of state ownership is directly linked 
                                                 
122  See A. Anderson and P.P. Gupta, ‘Corporate Governance: Does One Size Fit All’ (2013) 24 
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance 51; R. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance: Complicating Corporate Taxonomy’, (2006) Harvard Law Review 1641; M.J. Roe, 
‘Explaining Western Securities Market’ in M.J. Roe (ed.), Corporate Governance: Political and Legal 
Perspective (Colchester, Edward Elgar, 2005) at 279. See also R.H. Schmidt and G. Spindler, ‘Path 
Dependence and Complementarity in Corporate Governance’, in N. Gordon and M.J. Roe (eds.), 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
114. 
123  K. Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’ (2002) 
American Journal Comparative Law 97 at 97–130. 
124  O. Deniz, ‘Reforming Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Emerging Market 
Economies’ (2012) New English Journal of International Comparative Law 67 at 77. 
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid at 132. 
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to control of the board of directors, which is regarded as a critical link between 
ownership and control in the current Chinese corporate governance scheme.127 This 
decides the uniqueness of accountability and the ways it will be adopted, appropriately 
and effectively, in a Chinese corporate governance code or Chinese company law in the 
future. While the ownership structure, corporate governance model and economy have 
developed and been transformed very rapidly in China, the concept of accountability 
will also change, assuming a form that best suits China and the promotion of the success 
of its companies. 
If the Corporate Governance Code were updated, taking into account the use of a wenze 
system, it could reflect the fact that there has been a transformation from administrative 
corporate governance to something that is closer to economic corporate governance in 
China. The move from administrative to economic corporate governance may lead to 
accountability that is of a similar ilk to that found in Anglo-American systems. However, 
in the opinion of the authors, accountability in corporate governance in China will never 
be exactly the same as that applying in Western countries. This is based on several 
reasons in addition to the general concept of path dependency discussed above. Of 
critical importance is the stage of China’s economic development, and, of course, its 
unique history, culture, politics and traditions. Deng Xiaoping introduced the socialist 
market economy based on the dominance of the state-owned sector and an open-market 
economy with capitalist techniques being permitted to thrive. Deeply rooted Confucian 
philosophy, the unique guanxi and renqing traditions, government interference and 
participation in companies (especially SOEs), and the unique shareholder structure that 
resulted from privatisation are all important factors, and collectively they demand that 
the corporate governance model should be unique. 
 
So, in summary, we are suggesting that the Chinese language does not have an exact 
word that encapsulates the English word “accountability”, particularly as employed in 
relation to corporate governance and as explained earlier in the paper. However,  we do 
think that the use of the Chinese word “wenze” and its derivations conceivably can 
provide a system, which we have called a “wenze system”, that while it mirrors some 
                                                 
127  L.H. Tan and J.Y. Wang, ‘Modeling an Efficient Corporate Governance System for China’s 
Listed State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy’ (2007) 7 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 143 at 147. 
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of the elements of accountability as it applies in Anglo-American systems, is, more 
importantly one that will be able to be embraced in China, for the form of accountability 
that applies is never likely to be the same as in other systems around the world since 
China is developing accountability within its own unique corporate governance system 
and to address its own needs. 
 
V “Wenze Zhi” and Accountability in Administrative Corporate Governance and 
Administrative Law in China  
 
In this section, the history and definition of “wenze zhi” will be further discussed in the 
context of administrative law in China in order to clarify the nature and scope of the 
accounting system and to assess the appropriateness of employing the concept in the 
corporate governance field. Administrative law is used because it is in this area of law 
that accountability has been most frequently considered in China, as it has in many 
Western countries, and it has, as discussed below, had a profound influence on the 
development of corporate governance in China, as a hybrid corporate governance with 
the long-term coexistence of economic and administrative characters. This unique 
corporate governance with government interference and “administrativisation” of 
resource allocation, corporate objectives, and the appointment and removal of senior 
executives make the discussions of administrative law valuable and coherent without 
running a risk of diluting the discussion in the context of corporate governance. 
 
An accountability system (“wenze zhi”) was introduced as the result of the construction 
of a system of responsible government and is regarded as representing a profound 
revolution. It includes administrative ideas, development targets, government patterns 
and policy tools. 128  The establishment of an accountability mechanism and the 
safeguarding of a system standard are regarded as core concepts for the success of this 
revolution through the idea of “power restricted by power”.129 The standardisation and 
institutionalisation of this term has been essential to administrative law since the SARS 
crisis of 2003. It refers to a system in which government officials are required to take 
responsibility for their decisions and performance while subjecting themselves to the 
                                                 
128  L. Xia, ‘China’s Administrative Rule of Law in 2009’ in L. Lin (ed.) The China Legal 
Development Year Book (Volume 5) (Leiden, Brill, 2010) Chapter 6 at 159. 
129  Ibid  at 159–160. 
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scrutiny of those who entrusted and empowered them. It is introduced as a supervision 
system for the purpose of promoting administrative efficiency through enforcement 
mechanisms such as the following kinds of accountability: legal, political, management, 
and occupational ethics.130  
 
As far as government legislation is concerned, the introduction in 2009 of the “Interim 
Provisions on the Implementation of Accountability for the Leader of the Party and 
Government (关于实行党政领导干部问责的暂行规定 )” marked the formal 
commencement of building a more responsible government with accountability 
mechanisms. This process is regarded as a major step in enabling the strengthening of 
the legal system in order to combat corruption. It supports advocating “clean” 
government and improving the code of conduct for leaders, which is of great 
significance in strengthening the supervision of the work of the leaders of the party and 
government, and enhancing their sense of accountability, as well as providing a better 
implementation of the scientific outlook on development and continually improving the 
party’s governing capacity and the art of governance.131 The Chinese word “wenze 问
责 ” was explicitly used in the title of the provision and has been translated as 
“accountability” above. 
 
The Interim Provision was regarded as a vital step for the growth and enlargement of 
the accountability system in terms of establishing three mechanisms to ensure the full 
implementation of the system, as well as controlling and supervising public power 
within the system, namely responsibility, discipline and legal investigation.132 These 
three components of accountability work in a logical way by identifying and 
investigating responsibility, making sure the people who are responsible are directly 
disciplined, and, where they are in breach, incurring legal liability based on 
administrative law. 133  This is consistent with the stages and goals of corporate 
                                                 
130  T. Song, ‘On the Definition of Administrative Accountability (行政问责概念及内涵辨析)’ 
(2005) 2 Journal of Shenzhen University 42 at 42–43.   
131  Preface of Interim Provisions on the Implementation of Accountability for the Leader of the 
Party and Government 2009. 
132  Y. Li, ‘Downward Accountability in Response to Collective Actions: The Political Economy of 
Public Goods Provision in China’, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of 
Economics, number 2013–26 in its Working Paper Series. 
133  Article 12, Interim Provisions on Implementation of the Accountability of the Leader of the 
Party and Government 2009.  
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governance accountability where directors are required to disclose information 
concerning their responsibilities and directors are rewarded or punished for their 
responsible or irresponsible corporate actions. 
 
This Interim Provision has been seen as very effective, since 21,464 officials have been 
held responsible for failing in their duties and causing major workplace accidents and 
serious pollution incidents in the last year, and about 182,000 officials nationwide were 
punished in China in 2013.134 While the number of convictions does not necessarily 
mean that a system is effective, the Chinese authorities have been encouraged by the 
convictions and this has led them to believe in the effectiveness of “wenze zhi” in 
administrative law. The highlight of the accountability system has been the introduction 
of the three-year Action Plan of China’s State Council Information Office 2012–2015, 
regulating accountability where there are accidents concerning product safety, food 
quality, land requisition and environmental pollution.135 The accountability system has 
been used here to require officials and others to explain their actions, and it has led to 
the imposition of liability in relation to those who infringed the interests of others 
because of dereliction of duty. The effective use of the notion here does imply the 
possibilities of adopting wenze system in corporate governance. 
 
Looking to the future, a “five year planning outline for the Central Party Regulations 
(2013–2017 years)” has been designed to co-ordinate arrangements for the work of the 
Central Party over the next five years, putting forward the basic requirements, 
objectives and guiding ideology. 136  It is suggested in Section 4.5 that the Interim 
Provisions will be amended to improve the accountability system. This will be 
delivered by the party in order to monitor those officials who represent it. The 
amendment should clarify, as far as party officials are concerned, the following: the 
circumstances where accountability will be required; accountability norms; the 
consistency and cooperation of legal accountability; and disciplinary rules and 
                                                 
134  L. Gu (China News), ‘180,000 Officials Disciplined in 2013’ available via 
http://www.ecns.cn/2014/01-10/96477.shtml (assessed 8 July 2015). 
135  For the full text of the plan, see the Information Office of the State Council, National Human 
Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015), available via http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-
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136  See “Five year planning outline for the Central Party Regulations (2013–2017 years) 中央党内
法规制定工作五年规划纲要 ” available via http://qzlx.people.com.cn/n/2013/1128/c364565-
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sanctions. The word “wenze 问责” was used in combination with “zhidu 制度” 
(system), “qingkuang 情况” (circumstances) and “fangshi 方式” (norm) in the original 
Chinese documents in establishing the wenze system in administrative life. 
 
The increasing importance of the application of “wenze zhi” in administrative law is 
closely related to corporate governance, especially for SOEs where the relevant Party 
committee plays a pivotal role in the decision-making process, including the 
nomination of top executives, executive evolution and compensation, assets 
acquisition, and annual budgets.137 The State and the Party have a massive impact on 
corporate governance development and board accountability. This unique corporate 
governance system with characteristics from both administrative and economic 
governance enables the wenze system employed in administrative law to be applied in 
corporate governance. While the “wenze zhi” regulates civil servants in administrative 
law in China, it also regulates and supervises directors in SOEs who are often appointed 
by the State. Therefore, the accountability system in administrative law applies to 
similar people as those that are involved in the corporate governance system in China, 
especially those who are appointed to SOEs.  
 
The accountability system in Chinese administrative law is designed to promote a 
responsible government with more responsible governors, while the accountability 
system in corporate governance is established with the purpose of promoting more 
responsible boards of directors in a model with high state ownership and strong 
government involvement in corporate decisions. While the accountability system for 
administrative law applies to governors who lose the trust of the public, it can be 
observed that the accountability system for corporate governance does apply to 
directors who do not encourage and inspire competitiveness, and who are not trusted 
by the State, Party leaders, their shareholders and other related corporate constituencies.   
 
This discussion confirms the notion that board accountability in China is and will be 
different from the accountability process in other jurisdictions, just as corporate 
governance in China differs. The term “wenze” places more emphasis on the notion of 
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investigation by accountees, partly as a result of government interference, when 
compared to accountability in Anglo-American systems. An updated system of 
accountability may be developed in order to include some or all of the multiple 
dimensions as found in the English notion of accountability, which includes, apart from 
the notions of investigation, the following: information disclosure, justification and 
explanation by the board of directors for their decisions, and more efficient and 
effective legal enforcement measures to ensure the imposition of consequences from 
any investigation. A balance should be maintained between “wen” and “ze”, namely 
enquiry (“wen” as a verb) and responsibility (“ze” as a noun), and it is important to 
avoid  : enquiry without liability (“wen er bu ze 问而不责”); overemphasising enquiry 
(“da wen xiao ze 大问小责”); or hiding liability through the process of enquiry (“jie 
wen yan ze 借问掩责”).138 In the Chinese context, taking into account the four stages 
of accountability that we have identified as applying in Anglo-American systems is 
helpful for building more accountable and efficient boards for listed companies in China. 
However, during this unique transformative period from administrative to economic 
corporate governance, the nature of board accountability is likely to change to reflect 
developments in corporate governance rules, corporate law, stock markets and their 
rules, shareholders’ and directors’ knowledge and the qualifications and experience of 
directors.  
 
VI Conclusion 
 
The accountability of boards is clearly seen as a critical issue in corporate governance, 
and arguably accountability has a particular meaning in this context. In Anglo-
American systems it involves disclosure and justification by a board (the accountor) as 
to what has been done, questioning by shareholders (the accountees), and then possible 
consequences being imposed on the board. This paper has sought to determine what 
kind of concept of accountability exists in Chinese corporate governance and whether 
accountability, as articulated in Anglo-American systems or something similar, has 
                                                 
138  It might be helpful to translate a few individual Chinese characters here: 而 means but; 不 means 
no or not; 大 means big; 小 means small; 借 means using as a pretext; 掩 means hide. See also Y. Li, 
‘Accountability and Effectiveness of Corporate Governance (问责动了真格公司治理才有效 )’, 
available via http://www.cnstock.com/08yaowen//sdfx/201112/1753422.htm (accessed on 8th July 
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been embraced in China. We have found that where “accountability” is found in English 
language corporate governance and other related documents, it has been translated in 
China using different Chinese words. The reverse is the case, namely several Chinese 
words have been translated as accountability when the Chinese documents have been 
translated into English. We have suggested that Chinese does not have a word that fully 
encapsulates the English word “accountability,” especially as used in relation to 
corporate governance. The Chinese word that has been translated most often as 
accountability is “wenze”. However, the word “wenze” does focus on making enquiry 
concerning the actions of the accountor, and does not appear to embrace all of the 
nuances of the concept of accountability as determined in Anglo-American corporate 
governance.  
 
This paper has argued that while there appears to be a form of accountability in Chinese 
corporate governance, it is not equivalent to the approach adopted in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. The paper does not suggest that China should embrace the Anglo-
American approach, but should embrace what we term a “wenze system” of 
accountability that will enhance corporate governance and be able to embrace a Chinese 
approach to corporate governance. This is a dynamic notion and the wenze system itself 
may change with Chinese economic development and other variable factors such as 
shareholding and board structure, and government policies. 
 
We have argued in relation to administrative law in China that there is an accountability 
system that has some similarities to that applying in Anglo-American circles, and this 
is referred to as a “wenze system”. It has been posited here that the “wenze system” can 
provide a scheme of board accountability in China that will enable substantial 
accountability to take place and this will foster better corporate governance. 
 
We opine that elements of the concept and form of accountability embraced in Anglo-
American systems are likely to become more relevant in China as China moves from 
having a system totally based on administrative governance to one that is based more 
on economic governance. Nevertheless, we argue that even if China achieves this aim, 
and its governance has similarities to those applying in Anglo-American systems, it is 
never likely to embrace exactly the same concept or form of accountability as that 
applying in other systems around the world. The reason is that China’s corporate 
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governance system is different, and a unique form of accountability should develop to 
address the needs of corporate governance in China and the fostering of its listed 
companies. The link between Anglo-American accountability and a unique Chinese 
“wenze” system within the unique corporate governance transformative period can be 
seen in the following figure, which summarises the way that accountability works.  
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Figure 1: Corporate governance transformation and unique 
Chinese board accountability system 
